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Rann Smorodinsky† Shakhar Smorodinsky‡
Abstract
We introduce and motivate the study of hypergraphical clustering games of mis-
coordination. For two specific variants we prove the existence of a pure Nash equilib-
rium and provide bounds on the price of anarchy as a function of the cardinality of the
action set and the size of the hyperedges.
1 Introduction
In many strategic scenarios players are involved in a variety of games simultaneously and
players are not necessarily involved in all games. When these games are interrelated in the
sense that players choose their action simultaneously for all games and a player’s overall
utility is the sum over the utilities in each game then the collection of games forms a suc-
cinct representation of a larger game. Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [18] coin the term
‘hypergraphical game’ for such games. Given a hypergraph, each vertex represents a player
while each hyperedge represents the set of participants of a constituent game.
If, in addition, each constituent game (over a hyperedge) is symmetric and respects
permutation over the action set (renaming of actions does not matter) we refer to such
games as hypergraphical clustering games. For hypergraphical clustering games we will often
refer to actions as colors and a cluster is just a set of players that share the same color.
Restricting attention furthermore to utility functions that hinge on whether a player’s action
(or color) is different from those chosen by his peers we get hypergraphical clustering games
of mis-coordination.1
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Coloring Games”.
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1In a similar vein, when a player’s utility function hinges on whether the player’s color is the same as
those chosen by his peers we get hypergraphical clustering games of coordination.
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Hypergraph clustering games of mis-coordination come up in a variety of settings:
• Consider a frequency allocation setting, where individual radio stations (the vertices)
must choose their broadcasting frequency (color). Consider an arbitrary listener at
an arbitrary geographical point. This listener is within communication range of a
subset of the stations (a hyperedge). The broadcast quality of a station to the listener
depends on how different its frequency is from those chosen by others who are within
the listener’s range.
• An individual belongs to various social circles (family, work, childhood friends, etc.)
and must choose some property from some given finite collection, say his profession
or address. He derives utility from each social circle depending on whether or not his
choice is the same as others in the circle. It is quite natural to assume that an individual
would prefer to be co-located with peers from the various circles (coordination) but
may want to stand out in his profession (mis-coordination).
• A firm is involved in various markets (horizontally or vertically). The firm must choose
a branding strategy (equivalently, an accounting policy, a critical supplier or an IP
strategy). The utility from each of these depends on how close or far its choice is from
the competition in each of the relevant markets. This is a hypergraph clustering game
where each vertex represents a firm, a hyperedge represents a market and the set of
colors is the set of available branding strategies.2
• In an aerial transportation problem, each plane traverses space in a certain route com-
posed of segments. Each plane must choose a cruising altitude with a clear preference
not to share its altitude with other planes that simultaneously share the segment.
In this setting, vertices represent planes, hyperedges represent segments and colors
represent altitudes.
When we further restrict attention to models where the underlying constituent games
(the hyperedges) are two-player games we refer to these as ‘clustering games’. This class has
been studied in the recent decade and we further discuss this in Section 1.1. Defining mis-
coordination in the simple graph setting is straightforward. A vertex (player) gains utility
only at edges where the corresponding neighbor chose a different color. Moving from edges
to hyperedges allows for some flexibility in the notion of mis-coordination. To make the
distinction from the graph setting let us refer to vertices who seek to mis-coordinate their
color as homogeneity-averse agents.
We consider two variants of homogeneity-aversion:
• A weak notion of homogeneity-aversion is when each vertex gains, at a given hyperedge,
when there is at least one other vertex in the hyperedge with a different color.
2Anecdotally, a critical component of a branding strategy in consumer facing markets are actual colors.
For example, the cellular service providers in Israel are each associated with its unique color.
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• A strong notion of homogeneity-aversion is when a vertex gains, at a given hyperedge,
when its color is different from the colors of all other vertices in that hyperedge.
Note that both notions agree over simple graphs.
In this paper we study the price of anarchy (PoA) of hypergraph clustering games of mis-
coordination. The PoA, introduced in [14], has become the de-facto standard for measuring
the inefficiency resulting from delegating the decision on color choice to the players (the
vertices) as opposed to centrally assigning them. Since its introduction the PoA has been
extensively studied for many families of games. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
paper to study the PoA in hypergraphical games.
1.1 Related literature
The literature on hypergraphical games and in particular hypergraph clustering games (going
beyond simple graphs) is very limited. As already mentioned, Papadimitriou and Rough-
garden [18] introduce the notion of ‘hypegraphical games’ and provide computational results
regarding correlated equilibria in such games. Chung and Tsiatas [5] study the limit out-
come of various types of best-reply dynamics where at each stage some hyperedge is chosen
and its members change their color probabilistically. Simon and Wojtczak [19] prove the
existence of a strong equilibrium in a class of hypergraph clustering games they refer to as
synchronization games. They go on and study the complexity of computing Nash and strong
equilibria. Synchronization games are quite similar to one of our versions of mis-coordination
games with some exceptions. For example, in such games each vertex may have a different
color palette at his disposal.
Much more work has been done in the context of (simple) graphs (see [3, 4, 13, 16, 17] for
a sample of related papers). The class of games over graphs (or networks) was first suggested
as a model of wide interest by Kearns et al [12]. Hoefer [10] focuses on games of coordination,
where the utility function, at an edge, takes on a value of 1 when the corresponding colors
are the same and 0 otherwise and recently [2] studies the PoA and the strong PoA for this
class of games.3 In Anti-coordination Games (often refered to as Max k-Cut games) agents
get a utility for each edge where colors differ. The PoA and the Strong PoA in such games
has been studied in [11, 8, 9]. Feldman and Friedler [7] devise a unified framework for games
of coordination and anti-coordination, a class of games they refer to as ‘clustering games’,
and provide stronger as well as new results for the PoA and the strong PoA of such games.4
Optimal (centralized) coloring schemes have been studied in the combinatorics and com-
puter science communities. One prominent example is the frequency allocation problem.
For a detailed discussion of the problem and related results we refer the reader to a survey
written by the second author [20].
3The Strong PoA is the ratio between the social welfare obtained in the optimal outcome and that obtained
in the worst case strong equilibrium.
4The notion of a ‘hypergraphical clustering game’, introduced above, naturally extends the notion of a
‘symmetric clustering game’ introduced in [7].
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1.2 Organization of the paper
The formal model and the two utility functions we discuss are introduced in Section 2. The
two main theorems are stated in Section 3 while Sections 4 and 5 consist of the corresponding
proofs. Section 6 discusses the results as well as natural directions for future research.
2 Model
A hypergraph is a pair (V, E) where V is a set and E is a collection of non-empty subsets of V .
The elements of V are called vertices (alternatively, players or agents) and the elements of
E are called hyperedges (alternatively, coalitions). When all hyperedges in E contain exactly
two elements of V then the pair (V, E) is a simple graph. H = (V, E) is called r-uniform if
|e| = r for all e ∈ E . So, in this terminology, a 2-uniform hypergraph is a simple graph. We
say that H = (V, E) is r-minimal if |e| ≥ r for all e ∈ E . We denote by Hr the set of all
r-uniform hypergraphs and by H≥r the set of all r-minimal hypergraphs.
A k-coloring (alternatively, a strategy tuple) of H is a function c : V → [k]. We denote by
C(k) the set of all k-colorings. For a given k-coloring c and a hyperedge e ∈ E , let c(e) ⊂ [k]
be the image of e, i.e., the set of colors associated with the vertices in e.
Each vertex (player) is endowed with a utility function, uv : C(k)→ R. The social welfare
of a k-coloring c, denoted SW (c) =
∑
v∈V uv(c), is the sum of the agents’ utilities.
In this paper we focus on games of mis-coordination. In the case of simple graphs the
notion of mis-coordination describes settings where agents would like to mis-coordinate with
their neighbors. In particular each agent receives a utility of 1 for each edge it participates in
and where the color chosen by the neighbor is different than its own. Extending this concept
to hypergraphs is ambiguous. Let us denote by E(v) = {e ∈ E : v ∈ e} the set of hyperedges
containing v. We propose two natural extensions:
1. A vertex is called non-monochromatic seeking (an NM-vertex in short) if its utility
function is given by
uv(c) = |{e ∈ E(v) : |c(e)| > 1}|.
In words, a vertex enjoys each hyperedge in which its color differs from at least one other
vertex. Put differently, the utility function of v is the number of non-monochromatic
hyperedges containing v.
2. A vertex is called conflict-free seeking (a CF-vertex in short) if its utility function is
given by
uv(c) = |{e ∈ E(v) | |c(e)| = |c(e \ {v})|+ 1}|.
In words, v enjoys each hyperedge for which its color differs from the colors of all other
vertices in that hyperedge.
Note that for simple graphs (i.e., r = 2) the two utility functions coincide.
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A coloring c is called a (pure) Nash equilibrium if no player can increase her utility by
a unilateral change. Formally, uv(c) ≥ uv(c−v, i) for all v ∈ V and i ∈ [k] (where (c−v, i)
denotes the coloring c with agent v substituting her color to i).
For a hypergraph H and an integer k ≥ 2, put O(H, k) = max{SW (c) | c ∈ C(k)}.
Put NE(H, k) = min{SW (c) | c ∈ C(k) is a Nash Equilibrium of H}. When the number of
colors k is known and is clear from the context, we sometimes abuse the notation and write
O(H) and NE(H) instead.
For a given integer k ≥ 2 and a given family of hypergraphs H we define the Price of
Anarchy as PoA = PoA(H, k) = sup(H∈H) O(H,k)NE(H,k) .
3 Results
Each of the two utility functions induces a game. We will show that each such game is in
fact a potential game and hence admits a pure Nash equilibrium. For brevity we remind the
reader of the notion of a potential game:
Potential function: Let H = (V, E) be a hypergraph and let uv(c) be a utility function.
A potential function for H is a function ψ : C(k) → R such that for any two colorings
c, c′ ∈ C(k) if c and c′ differ only on one vertex v ∈ V . Then
ψ(c)− ψ(c′) = uv(c)− uv(c′).
The following lemma is well known (see, e.g., [15]):
Lemma 3.1. Let H be a hypergraph and u a utility function. If H admits a potential function
ψ with respect to u then there exists a pure Nash equilibrium for the corresponding coloring
game.
We provide upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy, for each of the utility func-
tions, as a function of two parameters: The number of available colors k and the hyperedge
size, r.
Theorem 3.2. Whenever players are non-monochromatic seeking:
PoA(H≥r, k) = (1 +
1
(k − 1)r ) ∀r ≥ 3, k ≥ 2.
Theorem 3.3. Whenever players are conflict-free seeking:
1. ( k
k−1)
r−1 ≤ PoA(Hr, k) ≤ 2k+r−22k−r whenever k ≥ r.5
2. k−1
r
(
k
k−1
)r−1 ≤ PoA(Hr, k) ≤ k−1r 2k+r−22k−r whenever r2 < k < r.
3. PoA(Hr, k) =∞ whenever k ≤ r2 .
The following two sections contain the proofs for both theorems.
5Note that for a simple graph, namely when r = 2, the utility function identifies with that studied in [11].
In addition, the lower and upper bounds equal each other as well as to kk−1 , the bound obtained in [11].
5
4 Non-monochromatic seeking agents
Throughout this section we assume vertices are NM-vertices, that is their utility is given by
uv(c) = |{e ∈ E(v) : |c(e)| > 1}|.
Claim 4.1. For an integer k, a hypergraph H = (V, E) and a coloring c ∈ C(k), let ψ(c) be
the number of non-monochromatic hyperedges in E . Then ψ is a potential function for the
corresponding hypergraphical clustering game.
The proof of Claim 4.1 is straightforward and hence omitted. Note that Lemma 3.1 com-
bined with Claim 4.1 implies that the game played among NM-vertices admits a pure Nash
equilibrium and, furthermore, that the best Nash equilibrium attains the social optimum.
However, other Nash equilibria may entail low social welfare.
Before we turn to the proof of Theorem 3.2 we require some notations and a lemma.
For an r-minimal hypergraph H = (V, E), a k-coloring c of H and a vertex v ∈ V we
define the following four parameters:
1. For any i 6= c(v) let di1(v) = |{e ∈ E(v) | |c(e)| = 2, c(e \ {v}) = {i} }| be the number
of hyperedges e ∈ E incident to v for which the color of all other vertices in e is i which
is different from c(v). Let d1(v) =
∑
i 6=c(v) d
i
1(v).
2. d2(v) = |{e ∈ E(v) | |c(e)| = 1}| is the number of monochromatic hyperedges contain-
ing v.
3. d3(v) = |{e ∈ E(v) | |c(e)| = 2, ∃v′ 6= v | c(e \ {v′})| = 1}| is the number of hyperedges
incident to v with exactly two colors, of which one vertex distinct from v has a unique
color.
4. d4(v) = |{e ∈ E(v)}| − (d1(v) + d2(v) + d3(v)) is the number of hyperedges containing
v that do not fall into any of the first three categories.
We denote by Di = Di(c) =
∑
v∈V di(v) the corresponding sums.
Note that for r = 2, the set of hyperedges in E(v) counted in d1(v) is identical to the set
counted in d3(v) whereas for r ≥ 3 those two sets are disjoint.
We need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Let r ≥ 3 and let H be an arbitrary hypergraph in H≥r. For any coloring c we
have:
1. D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 =
∑
v∈V |E(v)|.
2. D3 ≥ (r − 1)D1.
3. D1 ≥ (k − 1)D2 whenever c is a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. (1) is straightforward. (2) Note that for every vertex v d1(v) + d3(v) counts the total
number of hyperedges in e ∈ E(v) with |c(e)| = 2 so that there is vertex v ∈ e whose
color is distinct from all other vertices in e. Note also that any hyperedge e ∈ E with this
property is counted exactly once in some d1(v) and at least r−1 times in d3(u) for the other
vertices u ∈ e. So D3 ≥ (r − 1)D1. As for (3) let c form a Nash equilibrium. Note that
the utility of v is uv(c) = d1(v) + d3(v) + d4(v). Following a deviation of v from c(v) to
some other color i 6= c(v) will increase the utility by d2(v) (the corresponding hyperedges
that are monochromatic will cease to be so) but will simultaneously decrease the utility by
di1(v). As c is a Nash equilibrium the net increase cannot be positive and so d
i
1(v) ≥ d2(v).
Summing over i 6= c(v) gives d1(v) ≥ (k− 1)d2(v) for any v. The asserted inequality follows
by summing over all v.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.2:
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof has two parts. First we show that PoA ≤ 1 + 1
(k−1)r and
then we show that PoA ≥ 1 + 1
(k−1)r by providing an explicit construction of an r-uniform
hypergraph H and a Nash equilibrium coloring c for which O(H)
SW (c)
= 1 + 1
(k−1)r .
Upper Bound:
Let H be an arbitrary hypergraph in H≥r and let c be a Nash equilibrium coloring
that minimizes the social welfare SW (c) over all Nash equilibria so NE(H) = SW (c). Let
Di = Di(c). O(H) clearly satisfies the inequality O(H) ≤
∑
v∈V |E(v)| which implies that
O(H) ≤ D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 by part (i) of Lemma 4.2. By part (iii) D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 ≤
D1 +
1
k−1D1 +D3 +D4. On the other hand, as noted in the proof of Lemma 4.2, NE(H) =
SW (c) = D1 + D3 + D4. Hence,
O(H)
NE(H)
≤ (1+
1
k−1 )D1+D3+D4
D1+D3+D4
. As the enumerator is larger
than the denominator this expression is monotonically decreasing in D3 and D4. As D4 ≥ 0
and D3 ≥ (r− 1)D1 (part (ii) of Lemma 4.2) we conclude that O(H)NE(H) ≤
(1+ 1
k−1 )D1+(r−1)D1
D1+(r−1)D1 =
1 + 1
(k−1)r as asserted.
Lower Bound: The following construction proves that PoA ≥ (1 + 1
(k−1)r ):
Let A1, . . . , Ak be k pairwise disjoint sets each containing exactly r − 1 elements. Put
S =
⋃k
i=1 Ai. We first construct an auxiliary r-uniform hypergraph G = (S, E ′) as follows:
E ′ consists of all r-tuples of the form {Ai ∪ {x} | x ∈ S \ Ai, i ∈ [k]}. So there are a
total of k(r− 1) vertices and k(k − 1)(r− 1) hyperedges and each vertex belongs to exactly
r(k − 1) hyperedges. We now construct the r-uniform hypergraph H = (V, E) by taking
r disjoint copies of G denoted Gi = (Si, E ′i) and adding for every original vertex of v ∈ S
a hyperedge consisting of all r copies of v. Formally, V =
⋃r
j=1 Sj so |V | = r(r − 1)k.
Put E1 =
⋃r
j=1 E ′j. For a vertex v ∈ S, let {v1, . . . , vr} be the set of its copies in V . Put
E2 = {{v1, . . . , vr} | v ∈ S}. Finally put E = E1 ∪ E2. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Note that each vertex in V belongs to exactly one hyperedge of E2 and r(k−1) hyperedges
of E1.
Consider the following k-coloring c. A vertex v ∈ V is colored i if and only if it is a
copy of vertex in G that belongs to Ai. For this coloring the hyperedges in E1 are all non-
monochromatic. However, those in E2 are all monochromatic. Therefore uv(c) = r(k − 1)
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A1 A2 Ak
S1
S2
Sr
A hyperedge in E2
A hyperedge in E1 consisting of A2 and a vertex in A1
r − 1 vertices
Figure 1: Illustration of the lower bound construction in Theorem 3.2.
and SW (c) = |V |r(k − 1). Note that any unilateral change in the color of v adds a non-
monochromatic hypergraph to E2 but reduces the number of nonmonochromatic hyperedges
in E1 by 1 as well and hence is not profitable. Therefore c is a Nash equilibrium coloring.
On the other hand we can properly color this hypergraph by taking the coloring c and
make a cyclic shift in the colors for S1 where all vertices of Ai are colored with i+ 1 mod k.
Denote the resulting coloring c¯. As this is a proper coloring, uc¯(v) = r(k − 1) + 1 for each
v ∈ V . This, in turn, implies that SW (c¯) = |V |(r(k − 1) + 1).
Note that for this hypergraph
O(H)
NE(H)
=
max{SW (c¯) | c ∈ C(k)}
min{SW (c′) | c′ ∈ C(k) is a Nash equilibrium } ≥
r(k − 1) + 1
r(k − 1)
which proves that PoA(H, k) ≥ 1 + 1
(k−1)r .
Theorem 3.2 complements results obtained in [11] who provide a bound of k
k−1 for graphs
(namely for the case where r = 2). Note that our bound does not coincide with theirs. The
reason is that (as mentioned already) the hyperedges counted by the parameters d1(v) and
d3(v) coincide over graphs (where all hyperedges are of size 2) whereas they are pairwise
disjoint whenever r ≥ 3. Once we notice this our technique reaffirms the bound obtained in
[11].
5 Conflict-Free seeking agents
Throughout this section we assume vertices are CF-vertices, that is, their utility is given by
uv(c) = |{e ∈ E(v) | |c(e)| = |c(e \ {v})|+ 1}|.
For any coloring c and a hyperedge e ∈ E , put ϕ(c) = ∑e∈E |c(e)|.
Claim 5.1. ϕ(c) is a potential function for the hypergraphical clustering game played by
CF-vertices.
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Proof. Consider two colorings c and c′ that differ only on the vertex v. Assume c(v) = i and
c′(v) = j 6= i. uv(c)− uv(c′) =
∑
e∈E(v) 1(i 6∈ c(e \ {v}))− 1(j 6∈ c(e \ {v})), where 1 denotes
the indicator function. Note that |c(e)| = |c(e \ {v})| + 1(i 6∈ c(e \ {v})) and similarly for
c′ and j. Hence, since c(e \ v) = c′(e \ v), for any hyperedge 1(i 6∈ c(e \ {v})) − 1(j 6∈
c(e \ {v})) = |c(e)| − |c′(e)| and the conclusion follows.
Lemma 3.1 combined with Claim 5.1 ensures the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
coloring.
Turning to the question of the price of anarchy for CF-vertices, we now prove Theo-
rem 3.3 which provides bounds for the family Hr, of r-uniform hypergraphs. The proof of
Theorem 3.3 will make use of the following notations: Fix a hypergraph H = (V, E) ∈ Hr
and a corresponding coloring, c. For every triplet (e, v, i) ∈ E×V ×[k] we define the following
indicators:
• L(e, v, i) = 1 if and only if v ∈ e, |c(e \ {v})| = |c(e)| − 1 and i ∈ c(e \ {v}). Otherwise
L(e, v, i) = 0. In words, L(e, v, i) = 1 indicates that v gets a utility of one from e and
will lose it upon deviation to the color i.
• G(e, v, i) = 1 if and only if v ∈ e, c(e \ {v}) = c(e) and i 6∈ c(e \ {v}). Otherwise
G(e, v, i) = 0. In words, G(e, v, i) = 1 indicates that v gets no utility from e but will
gain one upon deviation to the color i.
• M(e, v, i) = 1 if and only if v ∈ e, |c(e \ {v})| = |c(e)| − 1 and i 6∈ c(e). Otherwise
M(e, v, i) = 0. In words, M(e, v, i) = 1 indicates that v gets a utility of one from e
and will maintain it upon deviation to the color i.
In addition, let j(e) = |{v ∈ e : |c(e \ {v})| = c(e)}| denote the number of vertices in e
whose color is not unique in e. Hence r− j(e) counts the number of vertices that are unique.
Note that |c(e)| ≤ r − j(e) + b j(e)
2
c ≤ r − j(e) + j(e)
2
= r − j(e)
2
. Put jˆ =
∑
e∈E j(e) and
conclude that ∑
e∈E
|c(e)| ≤
∑
e∈E
r − j(e)
2
= r|E| − jˆ
2
. (1)
We also need the following lemma which provides a bound on jˆ when c is a Nash equi-
librium:
Lemma 5.2. Consider an arbitrary H = (V, E) ∈ Hr and an arbitrary Nash equilibrium
coloring c. Then
1. jˆ ≤ |E|r(r−1)r
2
+k−1 .
2. SW (c) ≥ |E|r 2k−r
2k+r−2 .
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Proof. (1) As c is a Nash equilibrium, no vertex v can profit by deviating to some color
i 6= c(v). Therefore, for any v ∈ V and any color i 6= c(v), ∑e∈E L(e, v, i) ≥∑e∈E G(e, v, i).
Summing over the colors and the vertices and changing the order of the summation yields:∑
e∈E
∑
{v:v∈e}
∑
i
L(e, v, i) ≥
∑
e∈E
∑
{v:v∈e}
∑
i
G(e, v, i).
Adding M(e, v, i) on both sides we have:∑
e∈E
∑
{v:v∈e}
∑
i
(L(e, v, i) +M(e, v, i)) ≥
∑
e∈E
∑
{v:v∈e}
∑
i
(G(e, v, i) +M(e, v, i)).
Note that the left-hand side of the inequality satisfies:∑
e∈E
∑
{v:v∈e}
∑
i
(L(e, v, i) +M(e, v, i)) =
∑
e∈E
(r − j(e))(k − 1) = |E|r(k − 1)− jˆ(k − 1) (2)
while the right-hand side satisfies the following:∑
e∈E
∑
{v:v∈e}
∑
i
(G(e, v, i) +M(e, v, i)) =
∑
e∈E
r(k − |c(e)|) = rk|E| − r
∑
e∈E
|c(e)|. (3)
By Inequality 1 this latter quantity is greater than or equal |E|r(k − r) + jˆ r
2
.
Hence, |E|r(k−1)− jˆ(k−1) ≥ |E|r(k−r)+ jˆ r
2
. Rearranging terms we obtain the asserted
bound.
(2) Note that for any v ∈ V and for any i 6= c(v) the sum ∑e∈E L(e, v, i) + M(e, v, i) is
the utility of v and for i = c(v) the sum
∑
e∈E L(e, v, i) + M(e, v, i) equals zero. Therefore,∑
i
∑
e∈E L(e, v, i) +M(e, v, i) = (k− 1)uv(c) is k− 1 times the utility of v from the coloring
c. Summing over all vertices implies that
(k − 1)SW (c) =
∑
v
∑
i
∑
e∈E
(L(e, v, i) +M(e, v, i)).
Hence, by Equation 2 we have:
(k − 1)SW (c) = |E|r(k − 1)− jˆ(k − 1).
Dividing by k − 1 on both sides and resorting to the upper bound we have obtained for
jˆ in part 1 of the lemma we can conclude that SW (c) ≥ |E|r − |E|r(r−1)r
2
+k−1 . Rearranging terms
yields the asserted inequality. This completes the proof.
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of the upper bounds of Theorem 3.3 which
follows easily from Lemma 5.2:
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Proof. Let H be an arbitrary r-uniform hypergraph. Let c be a Nash-equilibrium k-coloring
so that SW (c) attends NE(H). By Lemma 5.2 we have SW (c) ≥ |E|r 2k−r
2k+r−2 . On the other
hand for any k-coloring c¯, SW (c¯) ≤ |E|r, so O(H) ≤ |E|r in the case when k ≥ r and
SW (c¯) ≤ |E|(k − 1), so O(H) ≤ |E|(k − 1) in the case when k < r. So for the case k ≥ r,
PoA(H) =
O(H)
NE(H)
≤ |E|r|E|r 2k−r
2k+r−2
=
2k + r − 2
2k − r
and for the case k < r
PoA(H) =
O(H)
NE(H)
≤ |E|(k − 1)|E|r 2k−r
2k+r−2
=
k − 1
r
· 2k + r − 2
2k − r .
This completes the proof of the upper bounds for parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of the lower bound in part 1 of Theorem 3.3:
We lower bound the price of anarchy using the following construction. Consider an r-uniform
r-partite hypergraph H = (V, E) as follows. V = ⋃ri=1Ai, where each Ai = {vi,1, . . . , vi,k} is
a set of cardinality k. A hyperedge is any subset of r elements in V consisting of exactly one
vertex from each Ai so there are exactly k
r hyperedges and each vertex belongs to exactly
kr−1 hyperedges. Consider the coloring c(vi,j) = j. That is, every set Ai is colored with all
the k colors. Note that the utility of all vertices equals (k−1)r−1. It is easily seen that when
a vertex, say vi,j, changes its color to, say l, then its utility does not change. Therefore,
this coloring is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the social welfare of this Nash equilibrium is
(kr)(k − 1)r−1.
On the other hand consider the coloring where all vertices of the set Ai are colored with
i (so we use a total of r of the k given colors). Notice that for this coloring the social welfare
of every vertex is equal to the number of hyperedges containing it, that is kr−1. So for this
coloring, the social welfare is (kr)kr−1
Dividing the two gives us the asserted lower bound as
PoA(H) =
O(H)
NE(H)
≥ (kr)k
r−1
(kr)(k − 1)r−1 = (
k
k − 1)
r−1
where the inequality follows from the fact that NE(H) ≤ (kr)(k − 1)r−1.
Proof of the lower bound in part 2 of Theorem 3.3:
We resort to the same example that we use for demonstrating a lower bound for the case
k ≥ r. As before, the coloring c(vij) = j is a Nash equilibrium with SW (c) = (kr)(k−1)r−1.
Consider also the coloring c′ where all vertices of the set Ai are colored with i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1
and with k for k ≤ i ≤ r. Note that each vertex in Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) gets a utility of kr−1
and each other vertex gets a utility zero. So SW (c′) = k(k − 1)kr−1. Hence:
PoA(H) =
O(H)
NE(H)
≥ k(k − 1)k
r−1
kr(k − 1)r−1 =
k − 1
r
(
k
k − 1
)r−1
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as asserted.
Proof of part 3 of Theorem 3.3: Let H be the hypergraph with r vertices – all
forming the unique hyperedge of H. The socially optimal coloring assigns k − 1 vertices a
unique color and the rest of the vertices the remaining color. On the other hand in a coloring
which assigns vertices (i, 2i) the color i, for i = 1, . . . , k and vertices 2k + 1, . . . , r color 1
forms a Nash equilibrium coloring where no agent gains and so its social welfare is zero. 2
6 Discussion and Open Problems
In this paper we consider some natural extensions of mis-coordination games on graphs
to hypergraphs and study equilibrium existence and the price of anarchy. The traditional
literature on hypergraph coloring considers centralized algorithms for assigning colors and
ignores incentives associated with the vertices. In this paper we study how the overall
efficiency is impacted when each vertex is associated with a self-interested agent and the
choice of colors is delegated to the individual vertices.
For non-monochromatic seeking agents we provide a tight bound on the PoA for r-
minimal hypergraphs. In particular, the bound we obtain demonstrates that there is almost
no loss of social welfare when decisions are decentralized as long as either the number of
colors or the size of the minimal hyperedge is large enough. For conflict-free seeking agents
the bound on the PoA we provide is not tight and hence calls for further research. When the
size of the hyperedges is roughly α times the number of available colors (r = αk) ) and is
large we provide an upper bound of 2+α
2−α whenever α ≤ 1 and a bound of 2+αα(2−α) for 1 < α < 2
(for α ≥ 2 the PoA is infinite). On the other hand the lower bounds we have for large k and
r are expα for the former case and exp
α
α
for the latter case. In particular for the case α = 1
(namely, k = r) we have e ≤ PoA ≤ 3. We hope that further research will help close this
gap.
Recall that an instance of a hypergraphical clustering game is specified by a constituent
symmetric game for r players (where r is the size of the hyperedge) and a hypergraph. The
PoA studies the ratio between the social welfare in an optimal assignment and that of a
worst case Nash equilibrium assignment. A natural choice for a social welfare function is
the sum of the utilities; however other natural social welfare functions are plausible. The
focus of this paper is on two specific utility functions (non-monochromatic and conflict-free
seeking). However, the model of a hypergraphical clustering game lends itself to a variety
of interesting research questions, some of which we discuss below. We view this paper as a
humble stepping stone to a potentially rich research domain.
Some natural utility functions left for future research are:
• Consider the case where a vertex v enjoys a utility of 1 from each hyperedge in which
it is the unique vertex with a unique color. Each such hyperedge represents a situa-
tion where the vertex has some monopoly power it can exert. Unfortunately, nothing
meaningful can be said for any pair r, k such that r > 2 ∧ k > 2 or r > 3 ∧ k = 2.
Indeed, consider a hypergraph with only one hyperedge e with r vertices. Any coloring
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which has at least two unique colors in e (say all vertices are colored by 3 except for
two vertices x and y such that x is colored with 1 and y is colored with 2) forms a Nash
equilibrium for which no vertex gains more than zero. On the other hand coloring one
vertex by 1 and all the rest by color 2 provides a social welfare equal to 1. Since the
ratio between the two is infinite the price of anarchy is unbounded. Nevertheless the
price of stability may yield interesting results.6
• Assume a vertex enjoys a positive utility if its color is unique; however the utility is
proportional to the number of such vertices in an edge. This represents a setting where
only vertices of a unique color can enjoy some benefit but this benefit is distributed
equally among all those unique ones.
• A third natural candidate for a utility function is one where each vertex enjoys a
hyperedge whenever that hyperedge has some vertex with a unique color (or maybe
even a single vertex with a unique color).
Most of the literature on the price of anarchy, similar to our approach, identifies the
societal objectives (the social welfare) with the sum of agents’ utilities. However, alternative
formulations (resulting in a different PoA) are often more adequate. Consider, the motivating
example of frequency assignment. The overall objective in that case could be to provide
service to as many customers as possible. This would translate to maximizing the number of
hyperedges containing a vertex whose color is unique. However, from an individual vertex’
point of view it would like to maximize the number of hyperedges for which its own color
is unique (CF-seeking). Note that in this case the social welfare does not coincide with
the societal objective function and consequently the bounds on the induced PoA could be
different from those obtained in Theorem 3.3.
The choice of domain of hypergraphs is another modeling choice that is orthogonal to the
specification of utilities and a social welfare function. In this paper we paid attention to r-
uniform and r-minimal hypergraphs; however there are other natural families of hypergraphs
that are of interest. For example, geometric hypergraphs induced by, say, discs in the plane
(see, e.g., [20]) which arise in the context of frequency assignments in wireless networks.
In all of the above the choice of colors is given at the outset. However, there may be
applications where the number of colors available to the players is regulated and the social
objective is to minimize the number of colors accessible to players. In that case one could
study the ratio between the number of colors required for a desired assignment in a centralized
vs. the decentralized approach. One can then imagine a natural concept of the ‘coloring
burden of anarchy’, dual to the PoA. For example, the ‘coloring burden of anarchy’ in the
context of a conflict-free coloring is the ratio between the number of colors required to obtain
a conflict-free coloring in an equilibrium and that number whenever this is dictated centrally
(χcf(H)). More broadly the notion of a ‘coloring burden of anarchy’ could refer to the ratio
6The price of stability, introduced in [1, 6], considers the ratio between the optimal social welfare and
that obtained in the best equilibrium outcome.
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in the number of colors for obtaining some social criterion between the decentralized and the
centralized cases.
Acknowledgements We wish to thank Chaya Keller for helpful comments on this
manuscript. We also wish to thank Ron Holzman for pointing out the lower bound construc-
tion in Theorem 3.3.
References
[1] Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Eva Tardos, and Tom Wexler. Near-optimal
network design with selfish agents. In Proceedings of the Thirty-fifth Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’03, pages 511–520, New York, NY, USA,
2003. ACM.
[2] Krzysztof R. Apt, Bart de Keijzer, Mona Rahn, Guido Scha¨fer, and Sunil Simon. Coor-
dination games on graphs. International Journal of Game Theory, 46(3):851–877, Aug
2017.
[3] Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Christos Koninis, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, and Paul G.
Spirakis. Distributed game-theoretic vertex coloring. In Principles of Distributed Sys-
tems - 14th International Conference, OPODIS 2010, Tozeur, Tunisia, December 14-17,
2010. Proceedings, pages 103–118, 2010.
[4] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Fan Chung, and Mohammad Shoaib Jamall. A network coloring
game. In Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, WINE 2008,
Shanghai, China, December 17-20, 2008. Proceedings, pages 522–530, 2008.
[5] Fan Chung and Alexander Tsiatas. Hypergraph coloring games and voter models. In
Bonato A., Janssen J. (eds) Algorithms and Models for the Web Graph WAW 2012.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7323. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012.
[6] Jose´ R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, and Nicola´s E. Stier-Moses. Selfish routing in ca-
pacitated networks. Math. Oper. Res., 29(4):961–976, November 2004.
[7] Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler. A unified framework for strong price of anarchy
in clustering games. In Halldrsson M., Iwama K., Kobayashi N., Speckmann B. (eds)
Automata, Languages, and Programming. ICALP 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, 2015.
[8] Laurent Gourve`s and Je´roˆme Monnot. On strong equilibria in the max cut game. In
Internet and Network Economics: 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome,
Italy, December 14-18, 2009. Proceedings, pages 608–615. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2009.
14
[9] Laurent Gourve`s and Je´roˆme Monnot. The max k-cut game and its strong equilibria.
In Theory and Applications of Models of Computation: 7th Annual Conference, TAMC
2010, Prague, Czech Republic, June 7-11, 2010. Proceedings. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
[10] Martin Hoefer. Cost sharing and clustering under distributed competition. PhD thesis,
University of Konstanz, 2007.
[11] Brian Powers Jeremy Kun and Lev Reyzin. Anti-coordination Games and Stable Graph
Colorings, pages 122–133. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
[12] Michael Kearns, Michael Littman, and Satinder Singh. Graphical models for game
theory. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Uncertainty In Artificial Intelligence,
pages 253260, 2001.
[13] Lasse Kliemann, Elmira Shirazi Sheykhdarabadi, and Anand Srivastav. Price of anarchy
for graph coloring games with concave payoff. CoRR, abs/1507.08249, 2015.
[14] Elias Koutsoupias and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. Computer
Science Review, 3(2):65–69, 2009.
[15] Dov Monderer and Lloyd Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior,
33:124–143, 1996.
[16] Marieke Musegaas, Peter E. M. Borm, and Marieke Quant. Simple and three-valued
simple minimum coloring games. Math. Meth. of OR, 84(2):239–258, 2016.
[17] Panagiota N. Panagopoulou and Paul G. Spirakis. Playing a game to bound the chro-
matic number. The American Mathematical Monthly, 119(9):771–778, 2012.
[18] Christos H. Papadimitriou and Tim Roughgarden. Computing correlated equilibria in
multi-player games. J. ACM, 55(3):14:1–14:29, August 2008.
[19] Sunil Simon and Dominik Wojtczak. Synchronisation games on hypergraphs. In Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
IJCAI-17, pages 402–408, 2017.
[20] Shakhar Smorodinsky. Conflict-free coloring and its applications. In Geometry — Intu-
itive, Discrete, and Convex: A Tribute to La´szlo´ Fejes To´th. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2013.
15
